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Abstract: The process of understanding the concept of freedom of expression is very complex and it 
implies thorough knowledge of the constitutional values and the analysis of the constitutional 
tradition of different legal systems. At the same time, a balancing operation is necessary between the 
value of freedom of speech and other fundamental rights, process that establishes limits of the 
expression such as criminalizing hate speech or other actions which affect the individual dignity. The 
human dignity has become a constant component of the constitutional case law of many States that 
share the same characteristics due to the promotion of fundamental rights. In the absence of a 
hierarchy of rights and fundamental freedom, freedom of expression is analyzed in many cases as a 
primary right (Kentridge, 1996, p. 254) that prevails over other fundamental rights. This study aims to 
analyze the landmarks of the German constitutional interpretation of the concept of freedom of 
expression, to identify its scope and types of speech excluded from the constitutional protection. The 
choice of this constitutional legal order was justified by the complexity of this topic and the 
specificity of the German history and tradition, elements that have contributed to an interesting vision 
in the matter of conflict between different fundamental rights. 
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1. Introduction 
The German theory on freedom of expression is based on the provisions of the 
Basic Law (Grundgeset)
2
 and its interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) which directed, corrected and streamlined legislation. 
This interpretation was significant and greatly influenced by the concept of human 
dignity contained in Article 1 of the Constitution (Bognetti, 2005, pp. 92-93). 
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Article 5 of the German Constitution is the main provision governing freedom of 
speech and it reads as follows: “(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and 
disseminate his opinion in speech, writing, and pictures and to freely inform 
himself from generally accessible sources. (2) Freedom of the press and freedom of 
reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. (3) There may be no 
censorship. (4) These rights are subject to limitations in the provisions of general 
statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of the youth, and in the right to 
personal honour.(5) Art and science, research and teaching are free. (6) The 
freedom of teaching does not release from allegiance to the constitution.” 
 
2. The Specificity of the German Constitutional Provisions 
The aforementioned provision has a declaratory character and applies to all 
persons. However, it does not entail a prohibition to the State bodies to limit the 
exercise of free speech, as contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States of America. Moreover, it was submitted that this text raises 
questions regarding the impact of these provisions on individuals but it provides no 
answer (Kommers, 1997). 
The most significant feature of Article 5 is that it does not protect a single right 
having different components. Instead, it asserts a number of independent rights and 
fundamental values (Jouanjan, 2009, p. 869): freedom of expression, right to 
information, press freedom, freedom of broadcasting, freedom of research, 
academic freedom and free education. By comparison, the European Convention 
on Human Rights contains in paragraph 1 of Article 10 the term "freedom of 
expression" which includes a number of components that come to complete the 
practical exercise of this fundamental right: freedom of expression and opinion, 
freedom to impart information, freedom to receive information, freedom of the 
press. 
In establishing a balance between freedom of expression and other fundamental 
rights, in particular a person’s right to reputation and dignity, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has constantly recognized that the provision implies a greater 
protection for the freedom to express opinions than statements of fact. Moreover, 
the Court determined that the allegations, even those having a defamatory 
character, which is made in exercising the right to reply, are covered by the 
protection of free speech. There has not been developed a universal applicable 
standard. The early case law originally stated the commitment to freedom of 
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expression in relation to other rights or interests of individuals, such as personal 
dignity.  
Another specificity of this constitutional vision is the removing of the public-
private distinction. As a consequence the provisions of the Basic Law protect not 
only individual rights against State action, but go further and require the State to 
act in order to ensure the respect of the fundamental right against violations 
committed by private persons. This procedure could cause a surprising effect: it 
could reduce the protection of freedom of expression. The explanation for this 
phenomenon is given by the State's obligation to protect other constitutional rights 
including the right to dignity (Alford, 2008).  
 
3. Freedom of Expression as an Absolute Fundamental Right  
The Lüth Case
1
 from 1958 is the first one in a series involving the freedoms of 
Article 5 of the Basic Law. The central issue concerns the public boycott of a film 
directed by a notorious anti-Semite and former Nazi supporter. The Federal 
Constitutional Court held that the right to free speech is an absolute fundamental 
right: “The fundamental right to free expression of opinion is the most direct 
expression of human personality in society, one of the most important rights (...) It 
is constitutive for a free and democratic state, whereas only through it is possible 
the constant intellectual debate, the clash of opinions, what is its vital element (...) 
It is clearly the ground for every freedom, the “matrix”, the indispensable 
condition for any other form of freedom.”    
Lüth has been described as the fundamental case in the analysis of freedom of 
expression. The Court’s interpretation includes some basic elements of German 
constitutional doctrine: it states that the Basic Law imposes an objective order of 
values influencing social structure, emphasizes the so-called “radiative effect” of 
fundamental rights, it sustains a variety of affirmative obligations for the national 
authorities in order to protect the fundamental rights against acts of individuals. In 
its jurisprudence, the German Constitutional Court ruled in several cases ruled on 
the premise that fundamental rights are the principal objectives in the legal order 
(Limbach, 1999). In this case, the Constitutional Court favoured the protection of 
communication in accordance with public issues concerned (Haupt, 2005, p. 324) 
                                                          
1 Bundesverfassunggericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 1 




by establishing a presumption in favour of freedom of expression in the context of 
public discussions to be applied in cases of libel (Barendt, 2005).  
 
4. The Conflict with other Fundamental Rights  
The Court’s interpretation in the Mephisto Case
1
 illustrated the balancing process 
between different constitutional liberties in conflict. In this case, the heir of a 
deceased German actor tried to prevent publication of a novel allegedly inspired by 
the actor's life, in which he was accused of collaboration with the Nazi regime and 
of betraying his political beliefs in order to continue his career. The application was 
upheld by decisions of ordinary courts stating that the publisher of the novel 
violated his freedom of artistic expression (Kunstfreiheit), guaranteed by Article 5 
(3) of the Constitution. It was the publisher`s opinion that artistic freedom, unlike 
freedom of speech was not opposed to the respect of personal honour, as stipulated 
in Article 5 (2).  
By contrast, the Constitutional Court found instead that the artistic freedom must 
also be interpreted in relation with the right to personal dignity, which is, according 
to Article 1 of the Basic Law, the supreme constitutional value. Article 1 [Human 
Dignity] reads as follows: “(1) Human dignity is inviolable. (2) To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority. (3) The German People therefore 
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human 
community, of peace, and of justice in the world. (4) The following basic rights are 
binding on legislature, executive and judiciary as directly valid law.”  
The Court went further and analyzed in an extensive manner the notion of dignity, 
by affirming the principle of recognition of its protection even after the death of the 
person. In finding a balance between this obligation and artistic expression courts 
must consider the prevalence and severity of the offending publication. The Court’s 
decision concluded that in this case, the dignity and reputation of the actor must be 
protected against false and distorted impression of the novel, although it was 
argued in separate opinions that the historical importance of the general theme of 
the novel overcomes the damage caused to the actor’s memory. 
 By this decision, communication has no longer received preferential status, being 
given the prevalence to human personality rights. It returned to that status in the 
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90s, by the decisions in Strauss Cases from 1987 and 1990.
1
 The Mephisto Case 
yields very clearly the commitment of German case law to personal honour and 
reputation in such a manner by which it is preferred to protect these values 
referring to a deceased person to the detriment of free expression of the living 
person (Carmi, 2008). In particular, the Court held that due importance must be 
given to whether speech or publication and the context in which they were issued 
or printed (Barendt, 2005, p. 215). Expression must be protected from civil or 
criminal proceedings for defamation when defamatory remarks are made 




5. The Status of Press Freedom  
The German Basic Law guarantees freedom of press and freedom of information 
by broadcasting programs and films, in the second sentence of Article 5. This 
wording suggests that freedom of the press and broadcasting have different content 
from the freedom of expression guaranteed by the first sentence of the 
constitutional provision. 
The German Constitutional Court has no hesitation in making a distinction between 
freedom of the press (Pressfreiheit) and freedom of broadcasting 
(Rundfunkfreiheit). Their coverage in paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Basic Law 
made this conclusion inevitable. The Basic Law protects both branches of the 
media as institutions. Their independence from State control is essential for a 
liberal democracy
3
. Institutionalized freedom of the press means, for example, that 
a newspaper is entitled to protection from economic pressure applied by other 
media companies when the latter threatens to stop supplies of those distributors 
who refused to cooperate in the conduct of a newspaper boycott.
4
 
In reality, these two freedoms are equivalent. Both have roughly the same meaning, 
freedom means the right to free speech of the beneficiaries: publishers and 
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journalists. The two terms were considered interchangeable in the American 
approach (Dicey, 1959). One of the drawbacks of the German interpretation is that 
any constitutional guarantee becomes redundant, since it adds nothing new to the 
concept of freedom of expression. This view is difficult to accept especially when 
constitutional provisions provide separate press liberty and freedom of 
broadcasting (Kumm, 2004, p. 585). 
In one case, it has been discussed the obligation of journalists to disclose the 
sources of information. The complaint to the Constitutional Court argued that, 
under Article 5 of the Basic Law, the press can fulfill its public function only if the 
sources of information may, if they wish to remain secret, because otherwise, the 
information would not be available. The Constitutional Court held that the right not 
to disclose the source of information is very closely related to freedom of 
expression of the press, being a part of it in the basis of Article 5. But the Court has 
not ruled on whether press freedom is a general exemption from the obligation to 
provide evidences to the court.
1
  
The Federal Constitutional Court found that the urge to boycott a press company 
for political reasons and in order to implement a boycott by means of economic 
power was not protected by the fundamental right of freedom of expression and 
constituted a breach of the fundamental right of press freedom. The reasoning of 
the Constitutional Court’s decision includes the principle that a boycott may be a 
possible mean of expression under Article 5 when it is part of a private or public 
argument in a political, economic, social or cultural debate. Although the aim to 
use economic pressure in support of an argument can be unconstititutional if the 
means are used to suppress the dissemination of news and information, as opposed 
to expressing an opinion. Moreover, the party urging a boycott should be in a 




An objection to the recognition of a constitutional guarantee extended to the 
institutional media is that such a guarantee could be interpreted as allowing actions 
that are incompatible with freedom of expression itself or even in a manner 
detrimental to the values and interests of freedom of expression. As such, one of 
the implications of a separate freedom of the press is that a newspaper owner 
would have an absolute right to determine its content. He could exploit his right to 
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the detriment of readers by jeopardizing their right to pluralistic information - one 
of the contemporary values that emphasize freedom of expression - by imposing a 
certain political line of the newspaper editors or by the arbitrary refusal to publish 
replies of readers with respect to false allegations printed in the newspaper. 
Another conflict may arise if "media barons" preclude application of competition 
rules with the argument that they would violate press freedom. In these 
circumstances it can be argued that the owner actually exercises a wide discretion 
in determining the use of his property (the newspaper or a business liberty), 
although he would argue that he was merely exercising his right to free speech. 
(Barendt, 2005, p. 421).  
However, the Court clearly established that freedom of the press does not provide 
for journalists, individually, special rights of expression. The dissemination of 
information and opinions in the press and other printed media is covered by the 
same right to free expression enjoyed by the other beneficiaries: the general right to 
free speech. Press freedom in general terms is aimed to the protection and 
organization of general conditions necessary to enable the written media to 
contribute to the development of public opinion. Within this approach the press 
freedom is an instrumental freedom protected in such a way as to promote the 
values of free expression (Barendt, 2005, p. 423).   
 
6. Final Considerations  
The German approach offers no clear answer on freedom of expression. The 
Federal Constitutional Court is caught in a complex balancing process for which 
has not found a universally applicable solution that could be used to solve the 
dilemma of the relationship between freedom of expression and other fundamental 
rights such as dignity. The German Court affirmed the protection of the dignity 
against freedom of expression in almost absolute terms in case of anti-Semitic 
discourse, German commitment to protect the sensibilities of Jews being 
particularly deep (Haupt, 2005, p. 333).  In case of other types of groups, the 
analysis focuses on individuals, not on the group and the German doctrine 
considers such attacks against each member individually and not as an attack 
against the group itself (Whitman, 2000, pp. 1279, 1281, 1312).    
Unlike other approaches (United States, Australia, New Zeeland), German case law 
makes few attempts to formulate precise rules under which to balance free speech 




defamatory statements made in political discourse or, more precisely, discourses on 
the one hand and politicians on the allegations made in public discourse in general. 
Rather, the Constitutional Court has set guidelines on which the ordinary civil and 
criminal courts are called in some circumstances to give priority to the reputation 
or free speech, while in other cases to balance between the two, depending on the 
specific data (Portelli, 1999, p. 28).  
The Federal Constitutional Court has experienced the anxiety of the conflict on 
fundamental rights by emphasizing the presumption in favour of expression that 
should be applied in those cases where defamatory statements are made during a 
real contribution to public discourse. The Court stressed that too many and too 
burdensome requirements for plaintiffs to sustain the truth of defamatory 
statements can have a stifling impact on the exercise of freedom of expression. The 
German Basic Law recognizes that honour is one aspect of constitutional rights to 
dignity and personality. Therefore, it would not be fair for courts to recognize 
automatically the predominance of free speech in any situation of conflict between 
it and the right to reputation. From this perspective it is better explained and 
justified the German balancing approach (Barendt, 2005, pp. 218-219).   
Despite all the criticism against German constitutional vision, it must be taken into 
account that no fundamental right enjoys absolute coverage and few are those who 
have absolute rigor (Schauer, 2005, p. 25).   
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